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SUMMARIES OF ARTICLES.

[ABBREVIATIONS. — *Am. J. Ps.* = *American Journal of Psychology; Ar. f. G. Ph.* = *Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie; Int. J. E.* = *International Journal of Ethics; Phil. Stud.* = *Philosophische Studien; Rev. Ph.* = *Revue Philosophique; R. I. d. Fil.* = *Rivista Italiana di Filosofia; V. f. w. Ph.* = *Vierteljahrschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie; Z. f. Ph.* = *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik; Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn.* = *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane; Phil. Jahr.* = *Philosophisches Jahrbuch; Rev. de Mét.* = *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale; Ar. f. sys. Ph.* = *Archiv für systematische Philosophie.* — Other titles are self-explanatory.]

LOGICAL.

Généralisation et induction. G. FONSEGRIVE. Rev. Ph., XXI, 4, pp. 353-379; 5, pp. 516-536.

The following conclusions are reached in this study: — Generalization and induction are not different mental operations. To generalize is to form a concept which has a universal value. For this operation it is necessary: (1) to constitute the intension of the concept, and (2) to fix its extension. The intension is formed by an intellectual abstraction which is immediate and intuitive in character. This abstraction appears to be rather imposed upon the mind, than to be the product of any activity of its own. The determination of the extension demands: (1) the subsumption of the concrete cases under a concept, and (2) the conception of the indefinite possibility of a similar subsumption. But the subsumption of the concrete cases under a concept is an act of deduction; and the conception of an indefinite possibility of such subsumptions is the product of abstraction. Induction is, then, no special or unique act of the mind. In so far as it is a process of reasoning, it is identical with deduction. What it contains over and above the latter, is constituted, as we have seen, by abstraction, which is an immediate and intuitive act. There is no psychological difference of nature between ordinary generalization and the most rigorous and exact inductions of science. There is simply a difference in value, which is guaranteed in the latter case by our own internal conviction and by the assent of our fellows. — In conclusion the author emphasizes some of the practical results of his theory. If it be admitted that intellectual intuition is able to reach truths of a scientific order, it will, perhaps, be more easy to grant to it the same power with regard to metaphysical truths.

J. E. C.

Sur la formule logique du raisonnement inductif. H. LACHELIER. Rev. Ph., XXI, 10, pp. 369–378.

In the logical discussions of to-day, the tendency is to make induction nothing at bottom but a modified form of deduction. The present article is an attempt to establish this view. Usually, induction has the form of a syllogism of the third figure with a compound middle term. The difference between it and the corresponding figure in deduction is that the conclusion in the latter is always particular, while in induction it is general. Induction is of two sorts: (1) that which leads to the determination of general concepts, and (2) that which expresses the relation between cause and effect. With the latter, as the truly scientific induction, we are mainly concerned. Evidently no series of individual instances of a causal relation, however great in number, can make certain any universal statement of such causal relation. The whole problem is to establish the required necessity and constancy, and this can be done only through deduction. The statement of the causal connection, *i.e.*, of the law, is the conclusion of a syllogism whose premises are yet to be established. This conclusion may be a particular instance of a general law already known, or, if there is no such law, it may be a genuine hypothesis. Even in the latter case, the new law must be like those already known, and must be coördinated with them. Experience furnishes the facts, and, by the association of ideas, suggests their cause. When the hypothesis has been formed in this way, it is verified by a deductive syllogism, whose minor premise is the statement of the facts. Empirical laws, on the other hand, seem to be determined by an inductive process, and thus are merely provisional until, by means of deduction, they can be reduced to causal laws. The original hypothesis is first suggested to the mind because it satisfies the needs of thought. Hence it is clear that deduction is the only form of reasoning. Induction denotes merely a complex of mental procedures whereby the thinker discovers hypothetical causal laws, and verifies the conclusions which follow from his hypotheses.

GRACE NEAL DOLSON.

PSYCHOLOGICAL.

On the Conditions of Fatigue in Reading. HAROLD GRIFFING and S. I. FRANZ. Psych. Rev., III, 5, pp. 513–530.

The author assumes that any circumstances which lessen the rate of reading produce visual fatigue. Fatigue depends on several conditions. The most important is the size of the type. Experiments were made according to the 'method of rapid reading,' and it was found that type 1.8 mm. in height was read more quickly than type .9 mm. The rate of reading does not continue to increase with the size of the type, but reaches its maximum when the type is about 2 mm. in height. By the 'time of exposure method' it was found that words and phrases were perceived in large type in less time than in small type. By a variation of this method, in which the time of exposure was $\frac{1}{20}$ sec., about twice as many words and phrases were seen in large type as in small type. Further experiments, by determining the intensity of illumination necessary to read letters of different sizes, showed that fatigue increased rapidly when the size of the type decreased below 2 mm. The quality of the type is of little importance. Within the limits of daylight in well-lighted rooms, the intensity can vary within wide limits without causing much fatigue. When the intensity of illumination is very low, it is a source of greater fatigue than small type, and it should not be lower than 100 candle-meters. The quality of the illumination and the color of the paper are important. White light and white paper cause least fatigue; gray paper requires nearly twice as much illumination as white.

EDWIN P. ROBINS.

The Accuracy of Observation and of Recollection in School Children. S. I. FRANZ and H. E. HOUSTON. Psych. Rev., III, 5, pp. 531–535.

School children underestimate size (proportion), distance, and weight; and overestimate time and frequency. In general the older scholars are more accurate than the younger. Boys estimate distance, time, and proportion more accurately than girls. Accuracy does not depend upon scholarship.

EDWIN P. ROBINS.

Das Erinnern. JOSEF MÜLLER. Z. f. Ph., CVIII, 2, pp. 232–253.

The phenomena of memory can be satisfactorily explained only by the theory of unnoticed, but conscious, ideas. In reproduction, ideas are neither (1) brought up from the depths of the unconscious, nor (2) actualized from mental 'dispositions' or 'potencies,' nor (3) created anew from cerebral 'traces.' They are brought into the foreground of consciousness by association, and are fixated by the attention. Discrimination must be made between 'unconscious' and 'unnoticed' or 'unattended to.' The idea never passes from the conscious to the unconscious. There is no absolute forgetfulness. The mind holds its entire past record — if only we could turn the attention on it. — Introspection shows that an important part of mind is made up of 'fringes' — elements which are unnoticed, but whose lack would make consciousness narrow and barren. When the mind is most active, its power of associating is greatest, and consequently its content reaches a maximum richness. It is a wrong tendency in psychology to narrow consciousness down to the clear point of attention. Unfixated memory reverberations are in every state of consciousness, and give the specific coloring to the personality. Reproduction and recognition receive no adequate explanation from theories of memory as a function of organic matter. 'Knownness,' which appears in recognition, is quite inexplicable in terms of ease acquired through repetition. Recognition is a judgment, and a *reproduced* idea must be present to mediate comparison. Though repetition may modify a sensation, the modification cannot be *known*, unless the unmodified form is reproducible.

I. M. BENTLEY.

Die Aufmerksamkeit und die Funktion der Sinnesorgane; Zweiter Beitrag. W. HEINRICH. Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn. XI, 5 u. 6, S. 410–430.

This paper continues and closes the author's account of his investigation of the changes in the peripheral organ of vision which accompany attention. Series of experiments were performed in order to discover the degree of accommodation in the eye for paraxial objects, when the attention is directed to these objects. Varying distances were used both for the object in the line of regard and for the paraxial objects, and the effect of each variation on the curvature of the lens was observed. Measurements were also made of the variations in the focal lines, due to differences in the angles of incidence of the rays of light passing from an object through the optic centre of the lens. The experiments show that the eye does possess a general, though not an accurate, power of accommodation for objects in the side field of vision.—The author remarks that these results confirm what he has already said: that it is not the attention which chooses an idea at pleasure, but that the physiological conditions change in such a way that at one time they favor the effect of certain stimuli, and the ideas dependent upon these stimuli become more distinct. He notices, also, that any process, such as deep breathing, which affects the curvature of the lens, will modify the process of attention, and may be a factor in the so-called oscillations of attention. — Subsequent papers will take up the question how far the principles which have been found to hold good for vision can be carried over into other sense-departments.

ALICE J. HAMLIN.

A Study of the Mob. BORIS SIDIS. Atlantic Monthly, February, 1895, pp. 188–197. *A Study of Mental Epidemics.* By the same, Century Magazine, October, 1896, pp. 848–853.

A mob is not formed of its own accord: it needs an instigator who shall give it impulse. Just as in the individual, so in a mob, a strong, sudden excitement hypnotizes. Hypnotic states are also induced by 'fascination.' The individual fixes his eyes on a brilliant point and thus falls into a stupor, in which state he imitates all the movements of the experimenter. So the mob is 'fascinated' by the hero. The man of the mob suffers a loss of individuality. Our voluntary movements give us our strongest sense of our own individuality. The man of the mob has his voluntary movements inhibited, and the feeling of individuality is literally squeezed out of him.

Intensity in the feeling of personality is in inverse ratio to the number of aggregated men; and the self of the mob becomes stronger, the more it consumes the individual self. The hypnotic states induced by really great men, — prophets, kings, and priests, are a species of '*elective* somnambulism': the image of the leader is all-absorbing, no one else can influence — an influence of personality. The hypnotic state induced by mob heroes is a kind of '*indifferent* somnambulism': any one can influence and divert the crowd — an influence of idea or object. The mob has its *origin* in a constitutional (acquired) predisposition, on the part of individuals, to pass into hypnotic states. This disposition is a matter of evolution — a characteristic acquired through the pressure of social laws and monotony of environment. The tiresome, dull, monotonous, and servile life, for example, of women, soldiers, and the lower social strata, predisposes them to social hypnotization. Mobbism seems, for this reason, to be characteristic of the lower social strata. — In his second article Mr. Sidis continues the same thoughts on the origin of the mob. The leading points are: that the chief phenomenon of hypnosis is susceptibility to suggestion; that man, as the social animal *par excellence*, becomes, through environment and social pressure, characteristically susceptible to suggestion and hypnotization; and that, therefore, mental epidemics (mobbism) are due to social self-hypnotization.

J. D. LOGAN.

Voluntary Action. G. F. STOUT. Mind, No. 19, pp. 354–366.

With respect to the nature of voluntary choice all considerations of the actual motor efficacy of various conations are irrelevant, although the belief that bodily movements are practically certain, or at least possible, is an essential ingredient in the attitude of the agent. Excluding all modes of conation which do not include the idea of an end, and all longings after the unattainable, the difference between the conation called a determination of the will and other conations is the difference between volition and desire. A volition is a desire qualified by, or defined in, the judgment that we are going to realize an end, if possible. Introspective analysis exhibits the conative tendency as the reason of the judgment — as that peculiar kind of reason which we call a *motive*. This account explains the characteristics of volition. In motived action, a conflict of impulses ceases: we know what we are going to do. The psychological strength of a volition, or its power to maintain itself, is due, in the first place, to the effect which the judgment and established belief that we are going to realize such an end has on the general flow of mental activity, this judgment or belief shaping our thoughts and other volitions into consistency with itself; in the second place, to the identification of the willed line of conduct with the idea of the self, all opposing influences creating the idea of *personal* failure or success, and thus, again, appealing to the most ultimate and intimate of motives, the *integrity* (literal) of the moral person; and, in the third place, to an aversion to a state of irresolution, which is itself disagreeable, but becomes intensified by the idea of what our fellows may think of us. In the strictest sense of the word, an involuntary action is one which takes place in opposition to a voluntary resolution which exists simultaneously with it, and is not displaced by it. A voluntary act is one which takes place in consequence of the judgment that, so far as in us lies, we shall perform it. The converse is not true. The act is not voluntary when the judgment, that the action is going to take place, arises because the action is already otherwise determined ; the judgment is not the condition or cause of the action. An act which is apparently voluntary, may be said to be involuntary, when the volition of the moment is discordant with the general volition of a lifetime, and remorse follows. A man's system of conative tendencies has not found fair play, and has not developed itself in consciousness. These tendencies would determine volition, even if they did not determine the act. Again, the action may take effect before decision has been arrived at: we may act, before we know what we are going to do. The act is then involuntary, because it is contrary to volition, which demands suspension of judgment until the mind is made up. And finally, an apparently voluntary act is still involuntary when, like a reflex action, it is contrary to the express volition at the moment. Psychologically, the question between the determinists and their opponents can only be put thus: Does volition always follow the strongest motive? Allowing fully for the existence of masked motives, and also for the strength which a motive derives from its connection with the total mental organization, the advocate of contingent freedom cannot show that our resolutions are not formed on the line of the strongest motive.

J. D. LOGAN.

L'instinct de la conservation chez les enfants. LOMBROSO. Rev. Ph., XXI, 10, pp. 379–390.

One of the most striking characteristics of children is their instinct for self-preservation. This is manifested physiologically by heightened activity of bodily function and lessened sensibility to pain. On the psychological side, it finds expression in the law of economy of effort. As far as possible, the child makes use of gestures and imitative language, refuses to employ new terms, and continues to mispronounce words, even after he is perfectly able to speak them correctly. The same economic tendency appears in his conceptions. These are essentially concrete, and, when once they have been arranged in a systematic order, there is the greatest objection to a new arrangement. Again, the child is adapted to pleasure, and instinctively avoids pain. His love is confined to such objects as are useful or pleasant to him. Displays of affection or sympathy are to be explained by reference to the tendency to imitation. Love which is at all emotional is found only in abnormal children. In like manner, the same universal law is displayed in the moral life. The child is at bottom a thorough-going egoist, who learns by degrees that unpleasant consequences follow lying and other sins. In short, the law which rules all sociological and psychological manifestations, the law of the least possible effort, is supreme in child life.

GRACE NEAL DOLSON.

Le moi des mourants. V. EGGER. Rev. Ph., XXI, 10, pp. 337–368.

In the January number of the *Revue*, the author gives an account of the mental experiences of men who have been in imminent danger of death, and comes to the following conclusions concerning them. (1) The child in danger does not realize his condition. He has no vision of his self, *i.e.*, of his past, because as yet his self does not exist. (2) The adult has a self, which is the result of his past experiences. When in danger of death, by a sort of reaction he sees this self. (3) When death comes gradually, disease suppresses the idea of imminent death, and, with it, the correlative idea of self. — The present article is a continuation of the same subject. M. Egger first replies to the criticisms of Sollier, which appeared in the March number of the *Revue*, and decides that the latter's theory is applicable only in cases of syncope, extreme weakness, and the like. The remainder of the article is devoted to instances of last words of historic persons, to death-bed confessions, and to the mental experiences of people who have just missed death. The conclusion reached is that the special, spontaneous reaction of memory to the idea of death takes the form of a more or less visualized dream. There are all degrees, from those which find a verbal expression to the visions of the past which, in some form or other, are so common among the dying. The important element always present is the idea of death, which is necessary to call up into consciousness the past, *i.e.*, the self.

GRACE NEAL DOLSON.

Some Preliminary Experiments on Vision without Inversion of the Retinal Image. G. M. STRATTON. Psych. Rev., III, 6, pp. 611–617.

It has been claimed that inverted images on the retina are necessary for upright vision. But experiments weaken this theory. By means of an optical instrument, in which all objects appear inverted, an upright retinal image is obtained. An instrument of this kind was placed over one eye, and the other darkened. The first day it was worn seven hours, then removed with closed eyes; and the subject blindfolded. The second day the apparatus was replaced, and worn twelve and a half hours. The third day it was worn two hours. At first all objects seemed to be inverted, and did not appear to be real things. All movements of the body were awkward and uncertain, and were more definite when made independently of vision. Gradually the new order of objects began to be real, and visual perceptions corresponded with tactual. Near objects were the first to seem in position, and later, distant objects were more or less accurately located.

The experiment was not continued long enough to undo all past experience, but it seems to show that upright vision does not depend on inverted images. Upright vision is simply customary vision.

EDWIN P. ROBINS.

Ueber autokinetische Empfindungen. SIGM. EXNER. Z. f. Ps. u. Phys. d. Sinn., XII, 5, 6, pp. 313–330.

When a small, illuminated point, in an otherwise dark room, is steadily fixated, it appears, after an interval, to move. The apparent movement is first in one direction, then in another, the point returning after each excursion to the starting-place. This phenomenon is closely related to the apparent movement of a small stationary black dot on a light field. The explanation of the latter will be a part of the explanation of the former, and so will be first in order. Experiments are adduced to show that a visual sensation near the lower limen of perception (given by a very faint or a very small stimulus) affects not only the part of the retina directly stimulated, but, after a time, adjacent points. This whole area affected may be called the *Aktionskreis*, and differs from the "dispersion circle," as the latter increases the apparent size of the object, and makes it less distinct. When the field is filled with objects, the relative position of the objects is determined by the local signs of the retina. When, however, a weak stimulus, such as has been described, is given in a homogeneous field, an imperfect idea of location arises, due to the partial absence of comparable positions. The stimulus may affect successively different portions of the *Aktionskreis*, and thus give the sensation of movement. — If now the conditions are changed, and a light point is seen in a darkened room, the relative position of objects is entirely lacking, and the illusion of movement becomes more complete. As the object seems to move, we imagine we are following it with the fixation point, and, as no other objects are present to determine the true direction, the false idea that we are turning our eyes steadily may continue as long as the apparent movement follows a given direction. Consequently the apparent movement may become very great. This happens the more easily because the muscles effecting eye-movement give but a poor and inaccurate account of direction, and do not tell us that the line of sight has remained unaltered.

I. M. BENTLEY.

METAPHYSICAL AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL.

Über naiven und kritischen Realismus. W. WUNDT. Phil. Stud., XII, 3, pp. 307–408.

This article is a criticism of the 'Immanente Philosophie,' in the interests of which the *Zeitsch. für imm. Philos.* was lately founded in Germany by M. R. Kauffmann, with the coöperation of W. Schuppe and R. v. Schubert-

Soldern. The names of A. v. Leclair and J. Rehmke are also mentioned as belonging to the school. In the introduction to the article, Wundt shows that 'Realism' is not by any means an unambiguous term. If it is defined as 'the knowledge of concrete reality contained in experience which has been falsified by no prejudices or arbitrary constructions,' it is yet not easy to determine what is thus given to the naïve consciousness. For what is usually regarded as 'naïve' is, as a matter of fact, largely the product of logical reflection and abstraction. It is impossible for the individual to rediscover from his own consciousness what was its original condition. The only means by which we can form any correct idea of this starting-point, and of the progress from naïve to critical Realism, is by referring to the actual procedure of the sciences, as shown in their history. The philosopher has not to construct a theory of knowledge from his own consciousness, but he must be guided in his formulation of principles by observation of the way in which thinking has actually built up the various sciences. A theory of knowledge which is in opposition to the procedure of the sciences, is false. This is the principle which the author constantly employs in criticising the doctrines of the 'Immanente Philosophie.'—The fundamental tenet of this school consists in a denial that any knowledge can transcend the facts of consciousness. Taking the conscious content itself, we find that it consists of a knowledge of the thinking Ego, as subject, and of the sensation-content, as object. These two elements stand in relation, and mutually condition each other. The individual Ego, however, presupposes a universal or generic Ego (*gattungsmässiges Ich*). Identity and Causality are the two laws under which the thinking Ego orders and arranges its conscious content, the former being the only source of necessity. The standpoint of the natural sciences is distinguished from that of psychology, inasmuch as the former deals with objects that are immediately present to a plurality of observers, while the objects of the latter are 'immediate' for only a single observer. — These positions, as well as some minor points of the 'Immanente Philosophie,' are discussed at length by the author. It is shown (1) that the description which this school gives of the naïve consciousness, as immediately knowing its experience as conscious content and in relation to a subject, is mistaken. Immediate experience, as well as the procedure of science, shows that the unreflective consciousness begins with the experience of external objects: the relation to the Ego as conscious subject is known only through subsequent reflection. (2) The notion of the generic Ego is both transcendent and unmeaning. (3) Difference is as much a principle of thought as Identity, and, moreover, there is no such dividing line as is supposed between Identity and Causality. Even in mathematical equations, wherever the notion of function enters, we have a necessity which is largely determined by the principle of Causality. (4) The alleged distinction between psychology and the natural sciences is illogical, and does not correspond to the actual course of knowledge in dealing with mental and physical phenomena. — In Vol. XIII, No. 1 of the

Studien, the author gives, under the same title as that of the present article, a detailed criticism of Avenarius and his school. Some account of this paper will be given in our next issue.

J. E. C.

Sur l'idée de nombre. E. LEROY et G. VINCENT. Rev. de Mét., IV, 6, pp. 738–755.

This article proposes to account (1) for the rigorousness, (2) for the explanatory power, of the science of number. The first is secured by the use of the intrinsic concepts of the mind's own nature, operating according to its own laws ; the second, by their operating upon notions imposed either by experience or by intuition. Number is shown to satisfy these requirements, being generated from the notion of a *symbol*, that is, of a posited unity, by the logical activity of the mind. The same activity develops the whole science of arithmetic, which is merely an account of the operations which may be performed on the basis of these symbols, even to the 'transfinite' number of Cantor. That it is not a tautology, but leads to new results, is due to the activity of the mind. Thus " the object of science is to establish such a correspondence between thought and the external world, that it may be possible to look upon the mind as a notation of nature, or upon nature as a notation of the mind."

F. C. S. S.

La philosophie comme attitude. B. GIBSON. Rev. de Mét., IV, pp. 713–737.

The attitude of men to the world of things may be strictly scientific : this attitude is best exemplified by the mathematician, who aims to satisfy the intelligence by describing the world-movement in terms of mathematical functions of some all-embracing *formula*. But there is the thoroughly human attitude of those who regard themselves as self-determined members of one organic whole. The basis of this attitude is strictly philosophical. The world is only as we know it : the implicit rationality of things is made explicit in the human consciousness. But though consciousness makes the world, *i.e.*, the *cosmos*, yet our very *self*-consciousness at once separates us from, and unites us to, the cosmos. It is in virtue of the fact that we are self-conscious, that we are compelled to assume the philosophical attitude, and seek again the philosophical union of God, Man, and Nature. This is the organic attitude : the aim is to realize the immanent ideals of the universe in our own life. This is not a systematization of aims, but the concrete realization of the spiritual unity of God, Man, and Nature. To this end we must coöperate with the whole of which we are but parts or functions. This spiritual unity is realized when men submit their wills to the divine purpose of the universe through love for man and God.

J. D. LOGAN.

Metaphysik und Geschichte der Philosophie. Dr. Richard Wahle. A. f. G. Ph., III, 1, pp. 1-9.

Now-a-days ontological questions are set aside as insoluble riddles. But since these were the problems of Greek Philosophy, we cannot comprehend the movement of thought from Heraclitus to Aristotle, unless we renew our interest in the questions thus set aside. The problem of the Greeks was one which still presents itself to us at the present day: viz., How is change possible if being is permanent? To this Heraclitus replied that change alone is real, and there is no permanent at all. But from Parmenides there came the complementary assertion that change is mere illusion, while true being is permanent, as we find it in thought. While each of these views was emphasized and developed by Cratylus, Zeno, and the Sophists, the Pythoreans sought to unite them; and so they handed down to Plato two principles: (1) there is permanent being, and (2) there is an actual becoming. Plato's synthesis of these principles consisted in setting up the Idea, the Form, as the true being, apart from the process of events, but yet giving continuity to that process. This position is not mysticism, it is true philosophy: for it is inconceivable that true being should change. There were, however, difficulties in Plato's position. Aristotle had the acuteness to see these, although he had not the metaphysical genius to solve them. He attempted the impossible task of bringing the Idea within the process, and failed, as do those who, in our day, seek "the law in the atom." His position was that of the old Hylozoism: he sought to unite matter and force, — a union which is inconceivable.

Alex. Meiklejohn.

Théories du monde extérieur. J. Payot. Rev. Ph., XXI, 11, pp. 449-480.

Any present-day theory of the external world may be best understood by reference to recent or contemporary philosophical solutions of the problem of knowledge. General agreement may here be sought in the dictum that "we know only our states of consciousness and their interrelation." Materialism of the older type is no longer extant, though a revival of some of the inconsistencies with which such metaphysic was burdened is to be found in the 'transfigured realism' of the Spencerian philosophy. As type of an opposite philosophy, attention is first directed to the philosophy of Stuart Mill, which may properly be classed as sceptical idealism, in distinction from idealism of the objective type. With Mill, sensations and groups of sensations, among which there subsists a certain order of association, together with expectation, account not only for my present perception, but for my belief in an external world. 'Permanent possibilities of sensation' take the place of a material substratum. The order to which sensations, associated in space and time, are subjected, is an order of succession and an order of simultaneity. But Mill fails to see that a merely temporal order is insufficient to account for true objectivity. He should have seen that the spatial and temporal relations between sensations are, in the last analysis, nothing less than the law of causality, and that elsewhere his sceptical attitude with regard to causality is destructive of his theory of the external world. This partial view of objectivity also prevents him from seeing that 'expectation' is, in reality, the manifestation of a deeper principle, viz., the will-to-live ; of which empiricism is able to furnish only the outward expression. —With metaphysic of the foregoing type, and indeed with any idealistic position whatever, Spencer evidently possesses little sympathy. To the idealist, he submits, reason is an object almost of superstitious veneration. But, as reason means complexity, reliance must be placed on a simpler datum of consciousness. This may be found in the 'affirmation' which simple perception yields. We are thus furnished with a criterion of truth — the 'inconceivability of the negative.' But the employment of this principle evidently presupposes a certain individual power of reflection ; hence there is need of a second criterion, by which to judge of the applicability of the first. For this we are referred to the uniformity of ancestral experience and the doctrine of evolution. We are at last thrown back upon experience; and thus Spencer's attack upon idealism, here directed against the pretentious claims of reason, declares its incompetency. But no idealist has doubted the infallible dictum of consciousness that 'there is an object external to me and independent of me.' Rather, idealism directs its criticism against the supposed existence of an unknowable substratum, in support of which Spencer's positive justification of realism is adduced : it is an unwarranted reduplication of reality which finds no justification, even in Spencer's own theory, as an hypothesis necessary for the explanation of our phenomenal world. Finally, even the laws which serve as the explanation of the latter would lose their validity, if referred to an ultimate source which is unknowable. — Thus, the intermediary position, that the laws subsisting between sensations and sensation groups are in themselves eternal and immutable, is left untouched by these two writers. According to the author, the primary fact of existence is the 'will-to-live,' of which the empirical manifestation is expectation. By means of this, and in accordance with the law of association of sensations in space and time, which is to say the law of causality, we are enabled, chiefly by the sensation of muscular effort, to distinguish between an illusory world of mere perception and a world of external objects. Thus, by means of the objective character of the law of causality and the will-to-live, an objective world in space and time is made possible.

CARL V. TOWER.

HISTORICAL.

On the Interpretation of Plato's Parmenides. A. E. TAYLOR. Mind, No. 19, pp. 297–326; No. 20, pp. 483–507; No. 21, pp. 9–40.

Three theories have been advanced as interpretations of the *Parmenides*: (1) Anciently it was regarded as a treatise of mystical theology; (2) the *Parmenides* is a restatement by Plato of Megarian objections to the doctrine of ideas met by counter-demonstration of the equal unsatisfactoriness of the Megarian 'one'; (3) the objections to the doctrine of ideas are perfectly serious, and the hypotheses constitute not only the refutation of an opponent, but the foundation of a newer and sounder ideal theory. None of these theories is satisfactory. The author thinks that interpretation will have the highest claim to acceptance, which succeeds best in establishing a vital connection between the criticism of Ideas in the first part of the dialogue and the results of the conflicting hypotheses in the second. The problem is, therefore, to find in the antinomies of the last three-quarters of the dialogue, the solution of the difficulties raised in the first quarter of it. In the view of Socrates, there is a world of sensible things, and there is also a world of Ideas or Forms: sensible things are what they are, by virtue of participation in one or more of these independent forms; the forms, however, exist for themselves 'apart' (129 E) from the sensible world. Parmenides at once attacks the weak point in the position of Socrates, viz., that, in his attempt to explain the real world, Socrates had set up another which cannot, by any intelligible device, be made to fall within it. Socrates severs unity from diversity, and becomes involved in the impossible task of showing how these incompatibles come into connection. The world of ideas and the world of appearance fall hopelessly apart. The former can be neither (*a*) the *cause*, nor (*b*) the *truth* of the perceived world. The author, in a detailed analysis of this argument (130 B to 133 B), states *in extenso* his disagreement with Jackson and others, who find in the 'paradeigmatic' Idea a new version of Platonism which is free from the difficulties of the supposed earlier theory of μέθεξις. In 133 B–135 B we have the second part of the polemic against the errors of a hasty idealism. In the first part, the proof went to show that the εἴδη of Socrates cannot be the *ground* of the world's existence; in the second part, the proof goes to show that they cannot constitute its *truth*. If the world of Forms exists, it is at least incapable of entering into our knowledge. This is necessitated by the Idea's transcendence. The cardinal error of Socrates lay in the absolute severance between the Idea and the sensible world with which he started, and in its logical result of taking unity, on the one hand, as separable from diversity, and multiplicity, on the other, as divorced from unity. The two points in the Socratic doctrine which Parmenides attacks are the following: that the Ideas are (1) χωρίς, (2) αὐτὰ καθ' αὑτά. These objections are meant to place the inherent dualism of this would-be monism in the clearest light.

In the second part of the dialogue, we find some indication of Plato's own answer to these objections. The purpose of the *Parmenides* is to establish the abstract conception of the world as a system which is the outgrowth of a single principle, and thus to reconcile its unity with its diversity.

In the Parmenidean hypotheses, the 'one' and the 'many' do not refer to the contrasted worlds of Ideas and sensible things. This earlier dualism of the supposed two worlds has been abandoned. For Plato the 'ideal' world means the real world, in so far as it is an object of knowledge; and the problem how one 'Idea' can be present in many 'things,' and the problem how one 'Idea,' while preserving its unity, can enter into relations with many other 'Ideas,' are only two ways of raising the same question. For a thing, in the only sense in which a thing is knowable, is nothing more than a certain system of universals, or, in the Platonic terminology, Ideas. The proof that unity, so far from being incompatible with diversity, cannot exist without it, while dealing throughout with relations between Ideas, is the required solution of our difficulty about the connection between Idea and thing. The nine hypotheses of the *Parmenides* fall into two general classes, (*a*) those which start from the affirmation of the world's unity, (*b*) those which begin by denying it. They are as follows: (i) If the unity of the world be affirmed, what judgments can we make about that unity (1, 2, 3)? (ii) If the unity of the world be affirmed, what judgments can we make about its multiplicity (4, 5)? (iii) If the unity of the world be denied, what judgments can we make about that unity (6, 7)? (iv) If the unity of the world be denied, what judgments can we make about its multiplicity (8, 9)? The *first* hypothesis (137–142 B) ends with the disproof of unity. The *second* hypothesis (142 B to 155 E), in the course of its development, disproves the result of the first, and concludes that we are forced to conceive of the ultimate reality in such way that its unity permits the recognition of all the diversity of the actual world, as falling somehow within it. Judgments which assert the world's unity or its diversity, which attach to it spacial, temporal, qualitative, or quantitative relations of the most various kinds, will all have their own truth, while none will be the whole truth. In concluding the argument at 155 D, Plato asserts that *τὸ ἕν*, the supreme reality, can be the object not only of full knowledge, but also of opinion and sense-perception. Here the world of knowledge and the world of perception are not two different worlds (as in the *Theaetetus* and *Republic*), but the same world, more or less adequately apprehended. This makes the difference between the Platonic 'one' and such a unity as was asserted, in the physical sphere, by the Eleatics and, in the metaphysical, by the Megarians; it also answers the statement of Apelt that for Plato sensible appearance is *nicht-seyn*, as well as the English supporters of the theory of 'transcendence.' On the theory of the world's unity advanced by the youthful Socrates, all assertion and all denial about reality are alike impossible, while, on a rival theory, both are intelligible; and as the function of a theory is to explain and make intelligible, this rival theory may be said to have established itself. And here the dialogue might end; but as, in the *Republic*, Plato is not satisfied with the mere establishment of his thesis, so here corroborative evidence is adduced. We have still to consider the bearing of the two rival theories on the doctrine of multiplicity (hyp. 3–5), and what would follow from their denial (hyp. 6–9).

The *third* hypothesis (155 E–157 B) ends by bringing the conception of the "instantaneous" to bear on the problem of unity and diversity. The only way in which contradictory predicates can alike attach to reality is the way of succession in time. The *fourth* hypothesis (157 B–159 B): The Manifold turns out to be that very systematic whole of subordinate systems with which we have already, in the second hypothesis, identified the One. The *fifth* hypothesis (159 B–160 B) takes up the principle of the first hypothesis and applies it to the consideration of the Manifold, with the same consequences which there attended its application to the One. The *sixth* hypothesis (160 B–163 B): The reality which we affirm in any positive judgment is always a part only, never the whole, of reality, and has therefore an aspect of unreality; while that which, in any significant negative judgment, we exclude from reality, has nevertheless a reality of its own. The *seventh* hypothesis (163 B–164 B): The conclusion is as in the first hypothesis, that the One is merely unreal and unknowable. The *eighth* hypothesis (164 B–165 D): We can both assert and deny the seeming unity and systematic character of any and every object. The *ninth* hypothesis (165 E–166 C) makes the assumption of a thorough-going sensationalistic Pluralism, and proceeds to draw a sketch of the world as it must be consistently thought of on such a theory. — The result of the entire discussion is to show that the object of the second part of the *Parmenides* is this : to demonstrate that the crude Idealism which places reality in a mere undiversified unity, and the crude Sensationalism which finds it in mere chaotic diversity, alike end, when thought out, in Speculative Nihilism ; and to justify against both, as the true interpretation of the world, a theory which, while refusing to regard the multiplicity and change of sense-perception as the ultimate truth of things, yet looks upon it as a necessary and indispensable element in the whole. The author finally gives his reasons for regarding the *Parmenides* as Platonic, and for his belief that the views unfavorably criticised in the first part and in most of the second part are those of the Megarians.

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